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MARYLAND RULE ON FORFEITURE UNDER
LAND INSTALLMENT CONTRACTS ...
A SUGGESTED REFORM
By MARsHALL A. LEVIN*
I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
This is an attempted reform of a rule that has been
often discussed, and a few times corrected, but most often
it has been left to work its particularly odious "solution"
to the problem presented by a very common set of facts.
It is the problem that arises out of the situation created
when a person wants to purchase real property, and not
having sufficient money to pay the purchase price, he
arranges to finance the sale by a credit arrangement. There
are various financial devices: the most common being the
purchase money mortgage, the executory contract (in-
cluding the installment type) and in Baltimore City, the
use of a "ground rent" partially to finance the sale.
Although an installment land contract is analytically
included within an executory contract,
"the installment contract should be differentiated from
the ordinary executory contract for the sale of realty.
In the former, portions of the price are payable in
installments after the execution of the contract and
before the conveyance of title. The latter contem-
plates a single down payment, normally accompanying
the execution of the contract, and then a concurrent
conveyance of title and payment of the price. The
payment on the 'law day' is often but partially in
cash and largely by way of mortgage. Thereafter the
rights of the parties are governed by the law of mort-
'Of the Baltimore City Bar. A.B., 1941, University of Virginia; L.L.B.
1947, Harvard Law School.
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gages. While these two transactions take different
forms, they are used to accomplish an identical pur-
pose. In both cases the vendor seeks to retain an
interest in the property he has sold as security for
the payment of the unpaid balance of the price. It is
with the realization that the vendor's interest under
an installment is merely by way of security, that one
must approach the subject."1
For the purpose of this paper, the use of the ground
rent will not be considered, but instead the other methods,
particularly the installment contract, will be discussed.
Although the system of a ninety-nine year lease renewable
forever (popularly known as a ground rent) has been a
common form of real estate financing in Baltimore City
2
some of its basic advantages are now gone3 and its use is
said to be on the wane.4
In addition, there are many reasons, not only why a
ground rent might not be favored in the future, but where
it would be inadvisable to use it. The following list is
illustrative:
(a) From a vendor's standpoint
1. Speculating vendors
a. A person who is speculating on the chance of a
default by a vendee, will not choose the ground rent
because the amount of yearly rent is relatively small and
it is comparatively easy for a lessee to scrape up that
sum.5 The payments on an installment contract, however,
1 New York, Law Revision Commission, Leg. Doc. (1937) No. 65(M), 13.
- Lewis, The Taxation of Maryland Ground Rents (1939) 3 Md. L. Rev.
314, 316, n. 8.
3 Before 1884, it was possible to create irredeemable 99 year leases re-
newable forever, but in that year a Statute (Md. Laws 1884, Ch. 486)
was passed which allowed lessees the option in all leases thereafter created
for more than 15 years, to redeem them after 15 years at the value of the
rent capitalized, at 6%, unless the lease specified some other rate, not
exceeding 4%. In 1888, this period was shortened to 10 years (Md. Laws
1888, Ch. 395) and in 1900, it was finally shortened to 5 years (Md. Laws
1900, Ch. 207), -the latter two statutes allowing only a 6% redemption.
See, Md. Code, Art. 21, Sec. 111 (1939).
"This is the opinion of Professor Casner, inter alia (Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School, former Professor of Law, University of Maryland
Law School). His views were expressed in personal discussion at Harvard
Law School in the Spring of 1947.
'See Ferguson, In Defense of Baltimore's Ground Rent System, Baltimore
Evening Sun, January 14, 1914.
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will obviously be much more substantial and the corre-
sponding chance for default will be much greater. More-
over, a vendee under an installment land contract has no
period of "grace" after a default; whereas lessees under a
ground rent have six months in which to pay before they.
can be ejected.6
2. Casual vendors (under this heading, persons
other than those engaged in the real estate business
will be considered. In so doing, the various motives
and purposes of a normal vendor will be examined,
together with the corresponding devices which would
most effectively satisfy these motives).
a. If a person desires to sell a valuable piece of prop-
erty in an exclusive residential district, wishing to get
the purchase price as quickly as possible, he will not
lease it via a ground rent, because the potential lessee
(if a ground rent were used) might not be inclined to
exercise his statutory option to redeem after the five year
period,' and thus the potential lessor could not get the
principal unless he chose to sell the rent. Nowadays good
rents can be sold at a premium, but in days not far in the
past (and perhaps not too far in the future) many rents
sold for less than par. However, he could easily attain his
objective by the use of a purchase money mortgage or an
installment contract, which methods do contemplate the
payment of the principal at the end of the time specified
in the agreement, as well as partial payments in the
meantime.
If such a vendor were an investor desiring to keep his
capital as liquid as possible, this reasoning would become
even more obvious. It is true that he would have to look
far to find an investment which is as attractive as a
ground rent (since it brings a return of 6%) but this
advantage may well be overcome by a desire for liquidity.
If it is contended that one can sell a ground rent and thus
attain the same objective, the answer is that such an in-
vestment might not be as readily saleable as a fast moving
piece of property, such as a popular security.
Md. Laws 1872, Ch. 346, codified as Md. Code (1939) Art. 74, Sec. 78.
Supra, n. 3.
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However, even if a person is only interested in the in-
vestment feature of a typical ground rent, he is only sure
of 6% for five years, because Maryland has made all
ground rents created after 1900 redeemable at the expira-
tion of five years from the date of their creation." (This
does not take into account, of course, the small body of
irredeemable ground rents that were left intact by Mary-
land.)
b. If the vendor is dubious about the financial re-
sponsibility of the vendee, he can protect himself against
default much more effectively by the use of the mortgage
and land contract methods, than by the use of a ground
rent. A drop in land values which results from a depres-
sion or the gradual deterioration of a neighborhood is
usually accompanied by a greater number of defaults, and
yet, in such case, the owner of the ground rent must allow
the lessee a period of six months in which to make the
payment good.
It is true that the ground rent owner has received 6%
each year and can distrain against the lessee's chattels,9
as well as recover a judgment in personam against the
owner of the leasehold interest (including any mortgage
thereof), but under an installment contract, he can keep
all prior installments paid and these might be considerably
more than that which he has received under a ground rent.
(b) From a vendee's standpoint
1. Under present methods made available by the Fed-
eral Government10 one may arrange an extremely com-
fortable length of time in which to pay a mortgage, and
although the principal is definitely due at the expiration
of the specified period, the main advantage possessed by
a ground rent lessee (i.e. the right to pay an annual 6%
instead of the entire purchase price) is substantially
wiped out.
8 lbid.
9 See generally, Hartogensis, Maryland Statutory Modifications of the
common Law of Reoal Property (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 243.
10 See, 12 U. S. C. A. 1701, et 8eq. (1934).
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2. Moreover, a vendee who desires to obtain a fee sim-
ple title as quickly as possible would choose the contract
or mortgage method rather than obligate himself to wait
out the minimum five year period.
3. The entire amount that a vendee under a land con-
tract (or similarly, a mortgagor) pays may well be less
than the entire amount which is ultimately paid by a
ground rent lessee and the feeling "that it somehow seems
cheaper to many purchasers to be talking in terms of $60
than in terms of $1,000",11 can prove a trap for the unwary.
Finally, the notion of ground rents in practice has
been confined mainly to Baltimore City and the neigh-
boring counties, 12 and although this is really a conclusion
rather than a reason, this paper is, intended to cover the
methods used through the State, and hence a consideration
of the installment land contract and the mortgage is neces-
sary.
Assuming then, that the system of ground rent financ-
ing is not used,. let us consider the alternatives. I shall
proceed upon the hypothesis that the vendee cannot pay
the entire purchase price in cash, or that a credit arrange-
ment is favored. In such event, the parties can, as men-
tioned previously, use either the executory contract (in-
cluding the installment contract) or the purchase-money
mortgage device.
The growing tendency 3 is to accomplish this credit
objective by the installment contract,1 although it is ex-
tremely important to remember that the purchase money
mortgage and the installment contract are merely different
11 See Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysterious but Beneficial(1940) 5 Md. L. Rev. 1, 62.
12 See supra, n. 2.11 Inasmuch as the utility of the ground rent has become less effective
because of the Redemption Statutes, other methods will gradually sup-
plant it. Because of the ground rent's striking similarity to a mortgage, it
is necessary to examine both the mortgage and the Installment contract,
and to ascertain the merits and demerits of both. For reasons hereafter
stated, it will be seen that vendors will benefit more from installment
contracts than from mortgages and it Is predicted that Maryland will see
an increasing number of the former in the future. This has been the ex-
perience of the other Jurisdictions in the United States. See generally,
MACCHESNEY, THE LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE (1938) 106 et seq.
"
4 REEP, SECOND MORTGAGES AND LAND CONTRACTS IN REAL ESTATE Fr-
NANCING (1928) 1, and 160.
103
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forms of attaining the same end. Under this arrangement,
the vendee usually pays a certain amount "down" and
promises to pay the remainder in weekly or monthly in-
stallments.
The vendor will commonly be a real estate company,
or an individual selling through a real estate company.
If the transaction is not handled in this manner, there
will ordinarily be an attorney who draws up the con-
tract. By the insertion of certain magic phrases, the ven-
dor can secure himself an inordinate amount of protection
and a position that is unique in the law. The following
provisions may be put into a contract (in fact, most of
them are printed on all contracts of this type), and the
vendee will be completely hamstrung.
(1) Time is of the essence of this contract.
(2) In the event of default by the vendee, the vendor
shall immediately, upon such default, have the
right to declare the contract void and retain what-
ever may have been paid on said contract, and all
improvements that may have been made on said
premises and may take immediate possession of
the premises and remove the vendee.
(3) Any default shall cause all subsequent payments
to become due immediately, and vendor shall have
the right to compel the continued performance of
the contract by the vendee.
(4) Upon any default by the vendee, the vendor shall
have the right to foreclose the contract.
(5) The vendor shall have the right to use any and all
of the above-mentioned remedies.
(6) Waiver of any breach of this contract resulting
from default on the part of the vendee, shall not
be deemed to be a waiver of any other branch.
From a literal application of these provisions, it would
appear that if the vendee were to default at any time (even
at the time of the last payment) the vender could recover
possession of the land15 and keep the installments, no mat-
1" Ballard v. Knapp, 152 Misc. 215, 273 N. Y. Supp. 25 (1934).
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ter how many, nor how short the delay!"0 This is the evil
which is intended to be revealed and a solution proposed
by this paper.
Moreover, the vendee, being in possession, is usually
liable for all taxes and assessments, and in the event of
default, he has, in effect, made an economic gift to the
vendor. Even the value of permanent improvements that
have been made by the vendee enure to the vendor17 and
although the latter has clearly received income as a result
of the default, he is treated very benevolently by the Fed-
eral Government as concerns the income tax. 8
An examination of the legal results that flow from a
default reveals astounding protection to the vendor. If
the land has gone down in value and the vendor finds that
he would have a difficult time selling to another vendee,
he can waive his right to eject19 along with the clause
accelerating payments, and can sue at law for the inter-
mediate installments' without even tendering title; be-
cause the law regards the vendee's promise to pay as being
independent of vendor's promise to convey.2' (Of course,
if the judgment were satisfied, the vendor would have to
convey title.)
If, upon default, the vendor desires to "cut off the pur-
chaser's rights under the contract", 22 he can resort to fore-
closure by sale23 and unless the contract price has been
inordinately inflated,24 he will probably realize enough
"' III WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1938) Sec. 791. For an extremely
"tough" case, see Doctorman v. Schroeder, 92 N. J. Eq. 676, 114 A. 810
(1921).
17 The weight of authority is in accord, but ci. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) Sec. 357(2).
"'See, 26 U. S. C. A. 22 (b) (11) (1942). Note also Treas. Reg. 22(b)
11-1.
19 Reed v. Chambers, 6 Gill and J. 329 (Md. 1934).
20 Chace v. Johnson, 98 Fla. 118, 123 So. 519 (1929).
21 Boulware v. Roosie, 283 N. Y. Supp. 662 (1935).
112Supra, n. 1, 17.
21 See Vanneman, Strict Foreclosure on Land Contracts (1930) 14 Minn.
L. Rev. 324.
2, As was the usual case in the Florida land boom, for example. For a
thorough discussion, see Vanderblue, The Florida Land Boom (reprint from
May and Aug. 1927) Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics.
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to "make him whole". In the event that the proceeds of
the sale do not have this effect, the vendor can still obtain
a deficiency judgment and thus the protection afforded him
is seen to be clearly adequate.
Our vendor would avoid rescission like the plague
because that would obligate him to return the installments
that have been paid. The New York Law Revision Com-
mission, in its excellent study of this problem in 1937,
discusses the various remedies available to the vendor and
points out: "That vendors realize rescission to be a poor
expedient is attested to by the absence of reported cases
on point."2' 0
Another remedy available to the vendor is a suit at
law for breach of contract. On a superficial examination,
the defaulting vendee would seem to be protected from a
harsh result inasmuch as the measure of damages in most
jurisdictions,27 including Maryland,28 is the difference be-
tween the contract price and the market value at the date
of default (thus taking into account any improvements
that vendee has made, the latter being reflected in the
market value). This amount is decreased by any increase
in market value, and the more the vendee has improved
the land, the less he will have to pay in damages.
So far, so good. But the catch is that if the vendee has
paid more in installments than the amount allowed the
vendor by the standard measure of damages, he (the
vendee) cannot recover either the amount of such excess
(if he seeks restitution) or the amount by which the
market value has been increased by the improvements.29
The vendee, it is seen, is in a most insecure position.
After default, he cannot sue the vendor at law to recover
prior payments on the purchase price, because he has not
45 Assume the contract price is $10,000 and the market value at the time
of default is $7,000. If vendor has inserted an acceleration clause, the
entire amount of remaining payments become due and vendor can collect
the deficiency from the vendee, even to the extent of levying execution on
other property.
26 Supra, n. 1, 22.
27 WILIsToN, op. cit., supra, n. 16, sec. 791.
8 1II SEEDwIcx, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) Sec. 1018.
11 Steinhardt v. Baker, 163 N. Y. 410, 57 N. E. 629 (1900) ; cf., supra, n. 1.
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performed his own part of the contract. Moreover, if the
vendor has availed himself of the above mentioned pro-
visions"° (and almost every contract contains most of
them), the vendee cannot sue in Equity to reinstate the
contract because of the express condition therein contained.
There is, to be sure, a tendency to find waiver of default"'
on the part of the vendor, and, if so found, the vendee can
have restitution. -
But a vendor who has been rendered insecure is un-
likely, in fact, to voluntarily waive contract provisions he
has inserted for his protection in just such a situation,
and judicial findings that he has done so seem often to
constitute a deliberate judicial disregard of the vendor's
intent,3 inspired by a desire to squirm out of the forfeiture
rule.
It is my purpose to examine the origin of this body of
doctrine (and its economic basis); to analyze its present-
day status to ascertain whether it really will be followed
in Maryland; and to draft a statute which will both relieve
against some of the common law harshness and bring the
law into accord with 20th Century economic reality. In
so doing, I shall examine the results of similar statutes
in other jurisdictions and seek to prevent some of the
conservatism with which they are attended. As Professor
Simpson points out,3 4 . . .
"The real need is for carefully drafted statutes, the
effect of which the courts will be unable to evade,
and which will compel them to deal with installment
contracts for the sale of land on the same principles
which they apply without hesitation in the case of
transactions essentially similar in economic substance,
but set up in the form of a conveyance on credit with
a mortgage back as security."
so See, circa, n. 15, et seq.
at Pound, Progress of the Law-Equity (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 929,
952. "Strict doctrines as to forfeiture inevitably produce loose doctrines
as to 'waiver'." As an example, see Walker v. Burtless, 82 Neb. 211, 214,
117 N. W. 349, 350 (1908).
:2 Spedden v. Sykes, 51 Wash, 267, 98 Pac. 752 (1908).
1 Supra, n. 31, 952.
3, Simpson, Legislative Changes in the Law of Equitable Conversion by
Contract (1935) 44 Yale L. J., 754, 773.
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II. STATUS OF THE LAW IN GENERAL
A. Common Law
At one time, it was impossible for contracting parties
to make time of the essence in executory contracts for
the sale of land, 5 just as Equity denied the mortgagee a
decree enforcing strict compliance with a provision con-
cerning time.3 6 But Newland "7 pointed out that Lord Eldon
later declared that, notwithstanding what was said in the
earlier cases, 3 time might be made of the essence of a
contract.
The potentiality of this change was not immediately
apparent, and, as such, it did not result in any great
benefit to vendors. Without such a provision in a contract,
a vendor would have to wait a "reasonable time" after
default before he could pursue his normal remedies. 9
With the advent of the change, the vendor was enabled
to dispense with the necessity for waiting any time at
all. The devise was new and it was probable that only
the astute availed themselves of this advantage.
However, when the rule governing the time clause
was coupled with the forfeiture rule (along with the ever
present acceleration clause),40 vendors soon realized that
they possessed a very formidable weapon, in that they
could recover all prior payments. The validity of this
weapon was qiickly upheld by the courts4 'and the way
was made clear for the enunciation of the widespread rule
that if time is made essential, a vendor of land under an
installment contract can keep paid up installments and
recover possession of the land in the event of the vendee's
default.4 2
11 Williams v. Thompson (1782), stated from MS note in NEWLAND,
TREATISE ON CONTRACTS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF EQUITY
(1806). Gregson v. Riddle (1784) ibid. 239, 240.
Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. 264, 268 (1802).
'7 NEWLAND, op. Cit., supra, n. 35, 240.
Gregson v. Riddle, supra, n. 35.
Specific performance of the contract: Foreclosure of the contract;
Damages for breach of contract; Ejectment; Rescission of the Contract.
40 See item 3 of list of common provisions, circa n. 16.
41 Hipwell v. Knight, 1 Y. and C., Ex. 401 (1835).
42 WILLISTON, op. cit., supra, n. 16, See. 791.
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The explanation of this change seems to lie in the fact
that the 19th Century saw the flowering of the "laissez-
faire" doctrine to its fullest extent. This doctrine, with
its marked emphasis on freedom of the individual, brought
about a corresponding concept of freedom of contract.
Thus if the contracting parties chose to make this essential,
and to insert a forfeiture clause into their contracts, courts
of Equity would follow the dictates of the parties. Hence
if the vendee was in default, however minor, he was re-
garded as having breached his promise and he was not
entitled to recover any prior installments.4 3 This is now
firmly settled law in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions, including (it is submitted) that of Maryland.
B. The Law Today
While the doctrine of forfeiture still holds sway in most
jurisdictions, it has not escaped the condemnation of most,
if not all, legal writers," and statutory inroads have been
made in a number of jurisdictions in the United States,4"
as well as in Canada.4 6 These statutes have had varying
degrees of success in the preventing of forfeiture and
there is constant movement to expand the statutory field,
the latest attempt being in 1938 in New York.4 8
Even without the aid of statute, some Courts reach an
equitable result by computing the actual amount of dam-
age that the vendor has suffered, and then preventing
"3 Keefe v. Fairfield, 184 Mass. 334, 68 N. E. 342 (1903).
4" Ballantine, Forfeiture far Breach of Contract (1921) 5 Minn. L. Rev.
329; Corbin, The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of
In8tallnents Paid (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 1013; SYMONS, II POMEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, Sees. 365, n. 1, 362, n. 1; Pound, op. cit., supra, n. 31; see
supra n. 34; see also supra n. 23; WILLISTON, op. cit., supra, n. 16; see
also, 8upra, n. 17.
"5I.e., Ariz., Cal., Ga., Iowa, Me., Mich. (emergency legislation), Minn.,
Mont., Nev. (emergency legislation), N. D., Okla., S. D., Tex. (emergency
legislation), Wis. (emergency legislation).
4The loosely drawn Canadian Statutes are typified by the Alberta
Statute, Rev. Stats. of Alberta (1922) Ch. 72, Sec. 35(h). They followed
the House of Lords decision of Steedman v. Drinkle (1916) 1 A. C. 275
which allowed a defaulting vendee to recover the excess of paid install-
ments over vendor's actual damage.
17 Supra, n. 23.
"'An attempt which failed; see supra, n. 1, and infra n. 87.
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the vendor from retaining any excess payment. 9 More-
over, as has been noted, the harshness of the established
rule has resulted in an astuteness on the part of the vari-
ous Courts to find that the vendor has "rescinded" 50 or
"waived" the time clause.
Yet the weight of authority still upholds this exaction
in the nature of a forfeiture (which Equity "abhors" in
every other type of contract). The Civil Law, on the other
hand, provides at least a mechanism for producing a just
result, thus tacitly recognizing the rigors of the rule
adopted by the common law.51
III. STATUS OF THE LAW IN MARYLAND
There is no statutory provision in Maryland governing
the rights of the contracting parties, as to land contracts,
nor is there any mention of forfeiture, as concerns "time
is of the essence" clauses in installment contracts for the
sale of land.
Therefore the common law is in force and since there
is nothing in the Maryland Constitution expressly or by
implication to the contrary, the doctrine of forfeiture has
been in unquestioned existence since the independence of
Maryland as a State.
Judicial decisions stating that when time is of the es-
sence Equity must follow the intention of the parties
even to the extent of enforcing a forfeiture, are so legion
that the rule has taken on the aspects of a clich6. Thus in
Robinson v. Johnson,5 2 Judge Thomas, in a representative
statement, said:
"The general rule in Equity is that a stipulation
as to time of payment of the purchase price is not
regarded as a condition which requires strict per-
Norr!s v. Letchworth, 167 Mo. App. 553, 152 S. W. 421 (1912); Lytle
v. Scottish American Mortgage Co., 122 Ga. 458, 50 So. 402 (1905) ; Steed-
man v. Drinkle, op. cit., supra, n. 46.
10 See generally Pound, op. cit., supra, n. 31.
51 For example, see the French Code (Ctv. Code. Art. 1231) which allows
a Court to delay forfeiture. See also, the Swiss Federal Code of Obligations
(Art. 163) which allows a Court to reduce penalties which it considers to
be excessive.
93 137 Md. 610, 113 A. 121 (1921).
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formance to entitle a vendee to have the sale consum-
mated. But this general rule is subject to the qualifi-
cation that a purpose to make time of the essence
of the contract may be disclosed by its terms, or by
the circumstances and object of its execution and the
conduct of the parties. . . . Unless, therefore, parties
are to be denied the right to contract as they please.
.. Equity must allow the vendor to regain possession
of the land and keep the installments paid, whether
they actually constitute the actual amount of harm
suffered by the vendor as a result of the breach or
not."5 3
Judge Urner, in Acme Building Company v. Mitchell
54
is quoted to the effect that "in every instance it is a question
of intention to be determined upon the facts of the par-
ticular case."
In the later case of Budacz v. Fradkin,55 Judge Digges
held,
"In agreements for the sale of land, time is not
usually held to be of the essence of the contract, but
if from the terms of the contract, it is clearly shown
that the parties so intended it, or, as in this case, where
the parties expressly state such to be the agreement,
it is generally given full force and effect.... And so
where the terms of a contract expressly provide that
it shall be completely performed and consummated
by a certain date named therein, Courts of Equity are
bound to give full force and effect to the terms thereof,
unless the failure to perform by the time designated
is caused by the act or default of the party against
whom specific performance is asked to be decreed
whether he be vendor or vendee."
Judge Grason, speaking for the Court of Appeals in
1947, is the latest member of the Maryland Court to
approve of the rule and he does so unqualifiedly in Garbis
v. Weistock,56 a decision handed down recently.
He discusses the various cases in the past and distin-
guishes those which did not contain the magic words with
s' Italics supplied.
"129 Md. 406, 409, 99 A. 545, 546 (1916).
"146 Md. 400, 406, 126 A. 220, 222 (1924).
51 A. 2d 154 (Md. 1947).
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a curt, "Neither of the contracts dealt with in those cases57
contained a provision that time is of the essence of the
contract."
As concerns those which did, he cites Soehnlein v.
Pumphrey58 with approval, and concludes that since time
was of the essence in the instant case, the vendee had to
show that it was the vendor who caused the delay (about
which the dispute revolved) before he could get specific
performance. The Chancellor's findings, in the lower
Court, denying the vendee's request for specific perform-
ance, were made upon full consideration of all the evi-
dence, said the Court of Appeals, and consequently had to
be upheld.
It is important to note that in the Garbis and Soehn-
lein cases, the contract involved was of the executory
variety, providing for a certain amount to be paid by the
vendee at the time of signing, the balance payable at a
later time, which was to be concurrent with delivery of
the title deed. Moreover, the issues involved had a sig-
nificance other than the right of the vendors to keep the
payments made by the vendees.
In Abrams v. Eckenrode,59 there was a time clause in
a land contract and the vendee sued for specific perform-
ance. He had offered to pay the balance to the vendor
three weeks after the expiration of the time allowed by
the contract. The Court properly refused to allow this
remedy, even though vendee claimed that the vendor
waived the clause about the essentiality of time, pointing
out that any such modification of the contract must be
in writing.
This seems a proper case for allowing the clause to
be decisive, inasmuch as it will protect vendors from
tardily paying vendees, and as such, can offend no wise
legal policy. The forfeiture in this case would not have
possessed the objectionable feature which would be in-
volved in the case of an installment contract, on which
substantial payments had been made.
57 Supra, n. 54. Doering v. Fields, 50 A. (2d) 553 (1947).
58 183 Md. 334, 37 A. 2d 843 (1944).
5 136 Md. 244, 110 A- 468 (1920).
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Therefore, the result is clearly right. But the point is
that the rule applicable to this set of facts might be
wholly inapplicable where an installment contract is
involved, and yet the Maryland Courts do not seem to
have recognized this distinction in their decisions. Hence
there is real danger that they will apply the broad rule to
a situation where it would not only be inapplicable, but
where it would work hardship.
In Stern v. Shapiro,60 the Court of Appeals went a
step further because, although the contract in that case
did not expressly mention time to be of the essence, Judge
Offutt denied specific performance on the ground that cir-
cumstances can be indicative that the parties contemplated
it to be essential.
The contract involved was in other respects exactly
similar to the one in the Eckenrode case, but in this case
the vendee claimed that vendor's attorney misled him by
representing that vendor would overlook the delay. How-
ever the court held that the attorney did not have authority
to modify the contract and that if the evidence is not clear
that the vendee was in fact misled, the nature of the
contract and the surrounding circumstances can (as they
did in this case) indicate that both parties must have
scrupulous regard for time.
This, it is submitted, is also sound, because it refuses
to allow the weapons of Equity to be used to gain advan-
tage from a contract when the party seeking their use
has himself breached the contract on its face. Moreover,
the policy of not allowing written instruments to be varied
by parole agreements is one to which inflexible adherence
would seem to be justified.
The law in other jurisdictions concerning the extent
to which waiver will be found, has varied time and again
in inverse proportion to the harshness of the case. In
Maryland, the requirements for waiver also seem to be
in a somewhat uncertain state.
Thus, the Eckenrode case enunciates the rule that any
modification of a written land contract must also be in
" 138 Md. 615, 114 A. 587 (1921).
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writing and consequently, when vendee sued vendor for
specific performance after a delay of three weeks (and
there was no written explanation), it was denied. The
vendee had alleged that the vendor had extended the time,
but the evidence showed that after the expiration of the
designated time, the vendor offered to return vendee's
deposit and call off the contract. This evidently led the
court to construe the rule of waiver strictly.
Moreover, the court went so far as to say that even
if a husband (vendor) waived the time of payment, it
would be ineffectual unless his wife joined in the written
waiver. The potentiality of the latter words for mischief
seem boundless. 61
Four years later, however, the case of Cole v. Murphy6 2
seemed to relax the requirement by allowing the conduct
of the parties to also be determinative. In this case, the
vendee claimed (and the evidence was in support) that
he was ready at all times to complete the contract within
the designated time, but that vendor made no effort to
do the same. Hence, when the vendee sued for specific
performance, it was allowed, and the Court of Appeals,
in affirming, was satisfied that it was vendor's conduct
that caused the delay. Judge Stockbridge not only found
waiver, but announced the vendor was estopped from
taking advantage of any time clauses in the contract.
Budacz v. Fradkin,62a followed the same rule and
granted the vendee specific performance when the evi-
dence indicated that vendor had purported to sell to
another purchaser. The vendee made every effort to find
the sub-purchaser and clear up title and the Court, empha-
sizing his good faith, allowed specific performance.
" For example, a man could wait until vendee has paid a large part of
the purchase price and then write (individually) that he would grant a
few days delay. Following the words of the case literally, vendor could
eject vendee and keep the money on the ground that his wife had not
signed the instrument. The vendee would obviously be misled and it is
inconceivable that such a result should ensue.
02 144 Md. 369, 125 A. 40 (1924).
61* Supra, n. 55.
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However, in Schindel v. Danzer 3 the Court enunciated
a more precise definition of waiver and the subsequent
cases seem to require a tighter standard.
"Its elements are 'an existing right, benefit or ad-
vantage, a knowledge actual or constructive, of its
existence, and an intention to relinquish it' and to be
'operative must be supported by an agreement founded
on a valuable consideration, or the act relied on as a
waiver, must be such as to estop a party from insisting
on the performance of a contract'."
Thus in Spellman v. Dundalk Co., 4 vendor, after a delay
by vendee in an installment contract, declared the contract
to be void and claimed all prior payments as liquidated
damages. Although the vendee alleged that "someone"
in the vendor's office told him that he would not be penal-
ized if he did not pay on time, that explanation was not
acceptable to the Court, which said that the vendee was
bound by the written contract and that even if someone
in the vendor's office did speak superficially about relaxa-
tion of the strictness of the time provision, the considera-
tion did not move from vendee to vendor, nor did the
vendee suffer any detriment. Hence, the Court refused
to listen to any arguments of waiver or estoppel when
vendee sued for prior installments paid and directed a
verdict for the vendor.
It is important to note, however, that the vendor had
offered to revive the contract, but that vendee sued to
recover the money which the vendor retained in spite of
this offer. Thus the court's sympathies were directed to-
wards the vendor and he prevailed. The course of the law
has not always proceeded logically, and although the Court
of Appeals is to be commended for its flexibility when
its sympathies are obvious, this analysis (of the law of
waiver in Maryland) shows that ultimately the Court
is going to run into the case of a land contract drawn in
such a way that flexibility will be impossible.
161 Md. 384, 396, 157 A. 283, 288 (1931). The case involved the settle-
ment of claims against sureties of notes of insolvent corporation.64 164 Md. 465, 165 A. 192 (1933).
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Finally, in the Garbis case, the Court of Appeals with
the aid of a handy rule of evidence, appears to prefer to
let the ruling of the Chancellor below be decisive as to
whether the facts constitute a waiver. It adopts the "clearly
wrong" standard and holds that since the Chancellor saw
both parties and had the opportunity to judge their credi-
bility, his decision, in the light of the facts alleged and
consequently in the record, did not appear to be clearly
wrong.
Although the Dundalk case, could have been used to
bulwark its opinion, it was not mentioned, presumably
because it was not cited by counsel for either of the
opposing parties. Moreover counsel for vendee did not
cite the Fradkin 4a case in his brief, even though the vendee
in that case was granted specific performance. Nor was it
distinguished by counsel for vendor in his brief, although
Judge Grason came to his rescue and emphasized the fault
aspect of the rule of waiver.
The end result is that there does not seem to be any
cleancut set of rules that would serve to guide counsel in
giving advice as to what actually constitutes an adequate
excuse for delay in the performance of one of the essential
terms of a contract. Each case will turn on its own facts,
and while it is arguable that this is the most equitable
method of dealing with the problem, it does smack some-
what of the "Chancellor's Foot."65
An examination of cases more directly in point involves
a consideration of Spellman v. Dundalk 5a and Christian
v. Construction Co.6 In the former, there was a written
contract for the sale of an unimproved lot, made on April
1st, 1926. The purchase price was $1200, of which $120.00
was paid at the time of the signing of the contract, the
balance to be paid in installments of $12 a month. Taxes
611 Supra, n. 55.
65 Selden, Table Talk, ed. Pollock (Sold. Soc.) 43 (1927) . Equity
is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is
larger or narrower so is equity. Tis all one as if they should make tile
Standard for the measure we call a foot, to be the Chancellor's Foot; what
an uncertain measure this would be: . . . one Chancellor has a long foot,
another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot."
65- Supra, n. 64.
66 161 Md. 87, 155 A. 181 (1931).
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and assessments were to be paid by vendee after the date
of signing of the contract.
There was a time provision in the contract, plus a clause
that if vendee defaulted in any payment, the installments
already paid were to be kept by vendor as liquidated
damages. Vendee had made approximately 29 payments
($348) by September 1928, but then he defaulted. In May,
1929, he made a payment of $60.00, which was accepted
by the vendor, but after fourteen more months of default,
vendor declared the contract and said that he intended
to keep all the payments ($528).
One incidental point was cleared up by Judge Parke,
namely, that although the vendor accepted the $60, that
only precluded him from his remedies during the period
for which the payments had been made. After that, any
further default by vendee would allow vendor to resume
his original remedies.
If vendor had desired, he could have ejected the vendee
and kept all the prior installments, and this would have
been considerably more than the normal amount of dam-
ages that would be awarded under the usual measure of
damages rule (assuming that the value of the land re-
mained constant.) He would have been able to pocket
at least $528, part of which would be due to the insertion
of the various protective devices mentioned heretofore;
whereas for the breach of any other kind of contract, he
would only be able to collect the difference between the
contract price ($1200) and the market value at the date
of the breach.
Of course, the vendor would be entitled to the fair
rental value during the period in which the vendee was
in possession, but ". . . the paucity of reported cases in-
volving suits for breach of contract by vendors under in-
stallment land contracts would indicate that seldom are
the vendor's damages in excess of the purchaser's pay-
ments." 7 In point of fact, the vendee demanded his money
back, but this was refused by the vendor who offered to
revive the contract instead. Vendee was unwilling and
01 Supra, n. 1, p. 21.
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sued for the prior installments that he had paid. A verdict
was directed for the vendor in the lower court, and on
appeal (based on certain evidentiary rulings) it was af-
firmed.
In the Christian case there was a similar contract, the
purchase price being $3000. A down payment of $10 was
agreed upon and the balance was to be paid in monthly
installments of $36. Vendee was to pay the taxes and
interest until the entire purchase price was paid. The con-
tract provided that if vendee was in default for over thirty
days, it would be considered a breach and the whole
amount would be due, (the normal acceleration clause)
and if that were not paid, the contract would be void (at
vendor's option), and he could keep all the payments as
rent.
The contract was made on April 1, 1926 and vendee
paid faithfully until August 1, 1927 ($576). Thereafter
he defaulted and did not resume payment until November
11th, 1928. Vendor then brought suit to recover the un-
paid balance, but vendee contested his right to do so on
the ground that one of the conditions of the contract had
been that the premises would be tenantable and that
vendor had failed to live up to that condition. However,
the court allowed vendor to recover without tendering
title on the ground that the covenant to convey is inde-
pendent of vendee's promise to pay, and it further stated
that the acceleration clause must be given full effect.
Here also, the vendor only chose to pull one of his
strings. If he had been a speculator gambling on defaults,
he could have simply ejected vendee and retained the full
amount of the prior installments. The fact that Maryland
has not seen such cases in Court should not be taken
as a guarantee that they will not occur. At minimum, it
should make a Court much more cautious in applying the
common law doctrine.
The outcome of this analysis seems to indicate that
although there is no precise holding that vendees cannot
recover past installments, the uniform dicta to that effect
and the corresponding emphasis on freedom of parties
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to contract, lead unwaveringly to the conclusion that such
is the law in Maryland today.
However, the broad dictum, when analyzed, really
covers many different types of cases. In some, the doctrine
would seem to be quite justified, but supportable on other
more rational grounds. Thus, as Professor Corbin points
out,6 where the vendor still has the right to specific per-
formance, the vendee should not be able to get restitution
for prior paid installments, because as long as the vendor
is willing to convey, vendee should obviously not be able
to repudiate the contract and escape scot-free. This is the
proper ground. Moreover, the injury sustained by the
vendor might be less than the amount that vendee has
already paid, and in this case it is just that vendee should
be denied the right to restitution.
However, the danger enters where such facts are not
present, and it is precisely in this type of case that the
Court might ruthlessly apply the doctrine where it would
result in injustice. Where the vendee is not acting in bad
faith and when the delay is easily capable of being cured,
there is simply no sensible reason to unthinkingly uphold
every consequence of a rule which is capable of such
flagrant abuse.
IV. DEFECTS OF THE LAW
The unfairness of this rule has not escaped notice of
the authorities and they are uniform in its condemnation."9
It obviously departs radically from the normal law of
contracts, in that it allows an inordinate measure of dam-
ages to be imposed by the parties, whereas the funda-
mental principle of damages in an ordinary contract is,
"..., and should be, to give compensation, that is, to put
the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have been
in had the defendant kept his contract."70
61 Corbin, supra, n. 44, 1017.
69 It is interesting to note that retail installment selling in Maryland
has come under the purview of those who feel that its evils warrant some
form of regulation. See Maryland Legislative Council, Retail Installment
Selling, Research Report No. 6 (Research Div.) which was submitted in
Sept., 1940, by Charles Mindel. In this connection, see infra, n. 80.
7 WILUSTON, Op. Cit., 8upra, n. 10.
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The departure from settled principles of Equity is
equally obvious. Thus the statement the "Equity abhors
a forfeiture" is so often repeated that it needs no citation,
and yet Equity is enforcing a forfeiture when it follows
the typical provisions in a land contract. Williston states
that "Where the transaction is in its essence, a mortgage,
agreements for forfeiture and provisions that time is of
the essence should be given no more weight than similar
provisions in a mortgage,"' 71 and Vice-Chancellor Gridley,
in a 19th Century New York case 72 said that
"... the proposition maintained by .. .counsel
(that a forfeiture could be worked if the vendee had
defaulted after paying most of the purchase money
and had improved the land...) is a bold and startling
one ... It seems to me that this is too monstrous a
proposition to be maintained in the nineteenth century
.. and would require the court of chancery to be the
organ and instrument of every Shylock, who chose
to insist upon the rigorous exaction of his pound of
flesh."
The objection may be made that if the parties are of
sufficient age, then why not allow them to make their own
contracts? The answer is twofold:
(a) The contracting parties do not have equal bar-
gaining power and therefore the much vaunted freedom
of contract is likely to be more of a snare than a blessing.
Thus Walker, 73 in a general text chapter of "Foims for
listing, Brokerage and other Contracts" inserts 35 form
contracts and every one concerning installment contracts
contains a time clause, along with a provision for forfeiture.
Thus, also, Reep's book" contains a number of "Points
to be Considered in Typical Installment Land Contracts",
71 Ibid.
71 Edgerton v. Peckham, 11 Paige 352, 357 (N. Y. 1844).
" WALKER, REAL ESTATE AGENCY (2d ed. 1922). In the form entitled
"Agreement for the Purchase of Land, with Provision for the Payment of
Purchase Money by Installments, the Purchaser becoming tenant of the
Vendor" the following is found : "If said party of the second part shall fail
to perform this contract-said party of the first part shall immediately,
upon such failure, have the right to declare the same void and retain
whatever may have been paid on said contract, and all improvements that
may have been paid on said contract, and all improvements that may have
been made on said premises . . . and may take immediate possession of
the premises and remove the party of the second part."71 Supra, n. 14.
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point 18 being ". . . forfeiture or partial restitution of pur-
chase money and possession on default... time of Essence."
In Maryland, "The Daily Record Company", Baltimore,
Maryland, issues a document entitled "Contract of Sale-
Form 19", which contains the printed provisions that
"time is of the essence of this contract", and this and the
forfeiture provision are in practically every contract form
used by Maryland realtors.
Yet it is exactly this type of form contract which is
unblinkingly classified as constituting intent of the parties.
It is submitted that if the parties were asked the meaning
of such clauses they would probably not be able to answer
the question in a manner which would shed any light on
its actual meaning. If this is so, the use of the intent
notion to justify the forfeiture doctrine would seem to
be a pure, but dangerous fiction.
On the other hand, vendees of realty do not have such
coldly impersonal protection. It is true that they can
employ attorneys who can eliminate the various cut-
throat provisions, but insistence on their deletion might
easily create suspicion that the vendee will not be prompt
in his payments and, at best, the consequent haggling will
constitute an impediment to the alienability of land,
an object of which the law has been extremely solicitous.
Moreover, a contract for the sale of land is a device to
effectuate transfers and not necessarily to provide at-
torneys with a means of sustenance.
(b) The second answer to the objection that freedom
of contract will be abridged is that the law has abridged
many freedoms of the individual when it considers such
control to be necessary and in accordance with the eco-
nomic temper of the times. Thus, although it has been
mentioned that the basis for this doctrine was laissez-faire
economy, no one can seriously controvert the proposition
that the 20th Century has seen a great expansion of gov-
ernmental regulation and a corresponding diminution of
individual liberty.
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Although speaking of price regulation, Mr. Justice
* Roberts said:
"The general rule is that both [the use of the
property and the making of contracts] shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property
to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom
of contract to work them harm. '75
This limitation was also recognized in Home Building
and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell,76 where the U. S. Supreme
Court held a Minnesota Statute constitutional which author-
ized local courts to extend the period of redemption, as con-
cerned mortgages past and present, for such time as the
court "may deem equitable" in view of the emergency of
1933.
It is submitted that a contention that private rights
concerning installment land contracts cannot be regulated
in a comparable manner is hardly tenable today.
The anomaly of the rule is nowhere more apparent
that when it is compared with basically similar transac-
tions: i.e. mortgage law and the law governing the con-
ditional sale of chattels. In Maryland, Equity will allow
a mortgagor, after default, to redeem within a reasonable
time, although the mortgagee's estate was absolute at
common law." We have seen how essentially similar are
the land contract and the mortgage, and therefore, it seems
strange for the law to allow mortgagors a reasonable time
in which to redeem, while cutting out purchasers under
a land contract with no remedy whatsoever.78
Although Maryland has not adopted the Uniform Con-
ditional Sales of Goods Act, Professor Arnold states9 that
"... [From C. I. T. Corporation v. Powell and Lincoln v.
Quyan,] . . . it is possible to infer that in Maryland, the
75 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 523 (1934).
7 290 U. S. 398.
77 Washington Fire Ins. Co. & Atlantic F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md.
421 (1870).
71 Note that a ground rent lessee has a statutory six months in which
to make up any defaults.
70 Arnold, Conditional Sales of Chattels in Maryland (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev.
187, 217.
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seller will be permitted to enforce whatever remedies are
stipulated for in the contract except that if it is necessary
for him to assert his claims in Equity, the latter Court
will not enforce what it may consider to be a forfeiture."' 0
Exactly why a purchaser of a chattel should be accorded
the protection of the Maryland Legislature, while a vendee
of land is not, is not rationally explainable. The price
that is usually paid for such a rigid adherence to the rule,
i.e., a distortion of the doctrines of waiver and rescission,
hardly seems worthwhile.
V. Busnqzss ATTITUDE
The view of the real estate people ranges from a com-
plete indifference, to an approving awareness of the ad-
vantages of the rule. The leading body of American real-
tors, the National Association of Real Estate Boards, has
never done anything about the problem, nor does it plan
anything in the future. When asked for an expression of
its attitude in answer to a number of specific inquiries on
the topic, it replied evasively that,
"The National Association has never taken any
action on installment land contracts. However I can
assure that from past experience, I am sure our Associ-
ation would favor regulation and a tightening up of
state laws covering such agreements.""'
Its organ, "The National Real Estate and Building Jour-
nal" has been silent on the subject since its inception, and
the standard real estate texts8 2 have been equally non-
committal about any reform.
For instance, Samuel Reep, past Chairman, Mortgage
and Finance Division of the National Association of Real
Estate Boards writes that,
80 However, retail installment selling in Maryland is now regulated by
statute. See Md. Code Supp. (1947) Art. 83, Sec. 118. This statute provides
that no seller shall receive any instrument from any buyer which provides
for repossession of goods or for acceleration of any payments, if the con-
dition is that the seller feels insecure. Secs. 128 and 129 show that a
buyer can redeem even if he has defaulted. Sec. 130 contains a provision
for foreclosure by sale.
81 Contained in a letter dated May 7, 1947, received from C. M. Jones,
Director, Dept. of Information, National Association of Real Estate Boards.
812 See BENSON AND NORTH, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (Rev.
Ed. 1938) ; MaeChesney, op. cit,, supra, n. 13; Reep, op. cit., supra, n. 14.
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"... mortgage law and contract law have come to
be two distinctive fields of legal specialization. Many
statutes have been enacted which apply to the one
and not to the other. The central practical business
problem of land contracts, in distinction from second
mortgages, is in the difference in time required to
get title to the property in case of default. This differ-
ence in time is the real reason why land contracts are
preferred to second mortgages by the vendor."
He admits that "the practical effect of cancellation on
the purchaser is therefore, a forfeiture of the amount paid
on the contract."8
Mr. MacChesney,84 under the auspices of the National
Association of Real Estate Boards, gave a series of lec-
tures for a real estate- study course, and made the following
comments:
Land purchase agreements occur frequently
in real estate deals ... The land purchase agreement
is merely another method of transferring title to land.
The parties state the terms on which they are willing
that the property change hands. In this way, disputes
as to what was intended may be avoided . . .When
time is made of the essence ... the payment by the
purchaser must be made when stipulated or buyer
runs the risk that the seller will declare the contract
forfeited. In that event, the purchaser loses the pay-
ments that he has made. In the same way, performance
by the seller must occur within the time stipulated
for it in the contract. A delay on the part of either
purchaser or seller may furnish the other party with
an excuse for failure to perform his part of the agree-
ment ... The strict requirement as to time for making
the payment under the contract may be waived by the
seller's course of conduct, or there may be an element
of estoppel which would work in favor of the buyer.
Due to the maxim that Equity abhors a forfeiture, the
court may find relief for the party who is technically
in default which would not be available in an action
at law .... Thus it will be seen that the courts are
open to those who have been injured by a party to
a contract for the sale of land."
Supra, n. 14.8' Supra, n. 13.
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The above is a perfectly adequate recital of the func-
tion of the "magic words", but one cannot believe that a
lecturer on real estate could be so naive as to think that
Courts actually would help those who have been injured
by a party, (to a land contract) who has used one of the
forms which his brother member on the Board, Mr. Reep,
has so well prepared. "Cooperation and responsibility"
are wanted, but as far as the leaders of the real estate
business are concerned, they are singularly silent as to
how these indeed worthwhile objectives shall be attained.
However, even Mr. MacChesney is willing to recognize
a fait accompli, because of discussing mortgages, he says
that
"... The whole problem of the rights of mortgagee
and mortgagor under a mortgage . . . deed and fore-
closure in connection therewith has been given greater
consideration than ever in connection with the severe
depression of real property values. There has resulted
not only new legislation ... ,but there has also been
a complete reexamination of the cases ... resulting in
many instances in what amounts to new law and the
reversal of the old cases."
It is again hard to see why there is acceptance of one form
of regulation, while the very evil sought to be corrected
is allowed to exist in another form, unless it be a tacit
recognition of an adequate loophole.
Another member (Mr. Fisher)8 5 however, felt that the
courts were too soft on vendees, and he even favored legis-
lation "remedying" the situation! He deplores the fact
that
"In case of default... , the owner can secure pos-
session, although the courts have in general been un-
willing to allow possession to revert to the seller too
easily."' 6
Perhaps some explanation for his attitude can be gotten
from the opinion of the New York Times,87 in regard to
1, Mr. Fisher was Assistant Executive Secretary of National Association
of Real Estate Boards in 1924.
FISHER, PRINCIPLES OF REAL ESTATE PRACTICE (1924) 116.
8 Sunday Ed., The New York Times, Apr. 4, 1937, Secs. 12 and 13 (Real
Estate).
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the Kleinfield-Reoux Bill, a New York measure killed in
committee, in 1937. It states that
some very dangerous legislation, although
of meritorious purpose, has been apparently side-
tracked this year in regard to installment land con-
tracts. If passed, these would have virtually killed
the subdivision business."' Recommended by the Law
Revision Commission, the Kleinfeld-Reoux bill would
force sellers to pay back installments of defaulting
purchasers, less damages and take over any improve-
ments made upon the land by the buyer."
VI. STATUTORY REFomv IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS8 9
Sixteen jurisdictions have attempted to deal with the
broad problem of forfeiture in general, but these statutes
have been much limited by judicial construction. In addi-
tion, the Restatement of Contracts enunciates the rule
that the vendor shall recover only the value of the actual
damage that he has suffered.
The most effective type of statute potentially is that
which gives Equity power to grant relief against penal-
ties. The California"0 and South Dakota9 statutes provide
that in the event of forfeiture, one may be relieved by
paying the other the full amount of the indebtedness. How-
ever the California Courts have held this provision in-
applicable to land contracts where time is made of the
essence, on the theory that the statute is only declaratory
of the common law!92 The South Dakota courts seem to
follow suit.93 In Montana94 where the same kind of statu-
tory provision is in effect, the vendee is given relief pro-
vided he sues independently to get such relief. 5 North
Dakota96 has not ruled on the effect of its provision, which
is basically the same.
88 Underlining supplied.
80 Much of the material in the following section was derived from the
excellent study published by the New York Law Revision Commission,
8upra, n. 1, and the analysis in Vanneman's acute article, supra, n. 23.90 Cal. Civ. Code (1931) Secs. 3275, 3369.
01 S. D. Comp. Laws (1939) Secs. 1958, 2006.
92 Collins v. Eksoozian, 61 Cal. App. 184, 214 Pac. 670 (1923).93 Hickman v. Long, 34 S. D. 639, 150 N. W. 298 (1914).
94 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1935) Sees. 8658, 8710.
85 Suburban Homes Co. v. North, 50 Mont. 108, 145 Pac. 2 (1914).
0 N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) Secs. 7138, 7188.
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Georgia's Civil Code 7 has been favorably construed
and the vendee is protected from forfeiture, provided
that he allow the vendor to deduct all damages that result
from his (vendee's) breach. On the other hand, the Okla-
homa Courts98 state that since the vendor and vendee are
in par delicto, the vendee cannot recover any prior install-
ments that he has paid. Maine," with the same type of
statutory provision does not seem to have ruled on the
subject as yet.
Canada has seen the advent of statutory intervention
in two of its provinces; Alberta"' ° and Saskatchewan.''
Although both statutes, in effect, merely turn the matter
over to Equity, that has not prevented the Courts on those
jurisdictions from construing them very liberally and the
vendee is accorded a large amount of protection against
forfeiture. 0 2
England, in a Privy Council decision,"3 held that al-
though the vendee could not get specific performance
when he defaulted in payment under an installment land
contract (where time was made of the essence and a pro-
vision for forfeiture was included in the contract), he
could apply to the Court for relief against the stipulated
forfeiture. This decision, incidentally, was handed down
in absence of any statute.
Another type of statute provides for a period of "grace"
in which the defaulting vendee can compensate the vendor
and reinstate his rights under the contract. In Arizona,'0 4
the period of grace depends on the amount that vendee
has paid (the length of time varies directly with the
amount paid)."' South Dakota allows vendor to foreclose,
but the court is given wide discretion and can prevent the
G7 a. Code (1933) Sees. 20-1403, 37-216.
8 Okla, Stat. (1931) Sec. 9488.
9 Me. Rev. Stat. (1930) Ch. 91, Sec. 36 (II).
1100 See, 8upra, n. 46.
101 Sask. Rev. Stat. (1930) Ch. 86, Sees. 2 and 3.
102 See generally Vanneman, op. cit., supra, n. 46.
20, Steedman v. Drinkle, op. cit., supra, n. 46.
,1" Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) Sec. 71-126.
105 For example, if vendee has paid 20% or less, vendor must wait thirty
days before he can enforce the forfeiture; if vendee has paid from 20% to
30%, vendor must wait sixty days; and so on, up to an amount over 50%,
for which vendor must wait nine months.
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strict letter of the contract from being followed when it
will result in undue harshness.
Iowa,1"6 Minnesota, 107 and North Dakota'08 evidently
feel that their respective Legislatures were not enacting
an, "I mean it" type of Statute19 because the grace pro-
vision has been construed to allow vendors an effective
remedy against vendees without the necessity for going
through foreclosure proceedings." 0
The third type of statute is of an emergency nature.
Thus, in the depression of 1933, the Legislature of Iowa,"'
Michigan,1 2 Minnesota," 3 Nebraska,"4 Texas,"' and Wis-
consin 1' provided that the Courts could grant extraor-
dinary relief in cases where it would be inequitable to
deny such relief, regardless of any terms in any contract.
However, such laws were applicable only during the
1933 depression, and have not, for the most part been very
effective. In fact, devices were employed to get around
any possible softness into which a court might be tempted.
For example, attorneys, knowing that a court might be
somewhat quick to find waiver, wrote contracts which pro-
vided that a waiver of any breach by the vendor should
not be deemed to be a waiver of any other breach, thus
effectively cutting off another possible avenue of escape
for the vendee.
It can be seen, then, that if a statute is capable of any
sort of construction, there is a tendency to construe it
strictly and to practically undermine the very purpose of
such legislation. The Canadian statutes seem much more
10' Iowa Code (1935) Secs. 12389-12395.
107 Minn. Stat. (1927) Sec. 9576.
108 See notes to N. D. Comp. Laws (1913) Sees. 8119-8122, and Secs. 8122
and 8122-a as added by N. D. Comp. Laws (Supp. 1913-1925).
"I Vanneman, op. cit., supra, n. 23.
110 Vendor must serve written notice of the default on the vendee. This
gives the vendee thirty days in which to pay the entire amount. If he does
not, vendor may foreclose. In effect, the courts have construed this to
mean that the vendee has only thirty days and thus vendor has the remedy
of strict foreclosure by the simple expedient of writing a letter.
111 Supra, n. 106, see specifically See. 12394.
112 Mich. Comp. Laws Supp. (1933) Secs. 14988-1 and 14988-3.
1" Minn. Stat. Supp. (1936) Sees, 9376-1 and 9576-6, as amended by
Ch. 68 (1935).
114 Neb. Comp. (Stat. Supp. 1935) Sees. 20-21, 159-20, 159-21, 164.
115 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Supp. (1935) Sec. 2218B (expired 1935).116 Wisc. Stat. (1933) Sees. 281.20-281.25.
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loosely drawn than the California type and yet the Cana-
dian courts seem much more responsive than the California
courts, to the manifest intent of the legislature.
The major defect of even the better drawn statutes are
that they do not expressly spell out what they mean by
"installment contract", nor do they provide that the statute
is to be applied to such contracts, in specific terms. More-
over, the time device is not even mentioned, thus ignoring
one of the largest loopholes. Finally, to preclude a com-
mon judicial "squirm""' 7 there should be at least a notation
in the statute itself, that it is not merely declaring the com-
mon law, but that it governs all prospective transactions
to which the statute is applicable.
APPENDIX
PROPOSED STATUTE OF MARYLAND
"A Bill" Entitled
An Act to Regulate Installment Contracts
for the Purchase of Land.
WHEREAS: The present state of the law is inequitable
because:
(a) It allows an unconscionable forfeiture to be worked,
many times to the detriment of those who can least
afford same.
(b) It allows an inordinate amount of damages to be
agreed upon by contracting parties, contrary to
settled principles of Equity and Contract.
(c) It is not in accord with the law concerning mort-
gages, in these respects.
(d) It is not consistent with the everyday workings.of
our economy,
AND
WHEREAs: It seems desirable to eliminate these defects
and abuses, and to substitute a more just and workable
rule,
2 , See Vanneman, op. cit., supra, n. 23.
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SECTION I-Be it Enacted by the General Assembly of
Maryland that:
Article A-In General
1-Whenever the vendee in an installment land
contract defaults in a payment of principal,
taxes or assessments, the contract shall not ter-
minate notwithstanding any provision in the
contract to the contrary. Instead, the vendor
may go into a court which possesses equitable
jurisdiction and request that the contract be
terminated. This court shall have power to
equitably adjust the rights of all the parties
thereto, and shall ascertain what is a reasonable
time for the vendee to pay the defaulted pay-
ment. It shall have power to decree that, at
the end of such reasonable time:
a-The vendor may terminate the contract,
provided that:
1-If the vendee has paid not less than
twenty (20) per cent, nor over fifty
(50) per cent of the stipulated pur-
chase price, this time shall be not
less than thirty (30) days measured
from the date of default.
2-If the vendee has paid over fifty (50)
per cent of the purchase price, this
time shall not be less than six (6)
months measured from the date of
default.
b-If the contract is terminated, the vendor
shall have the right to sue the vendee in
ejectment, or
c-If the contract is terminated, the vendor
shall have the right to sue the vendee for
breach of contract.
2-The above three remedies shall be the only
remedies of the vendor. (But the vendor shall
have the right to sue both in ejectment and for
breach of contract.)
3-In the event of termination, or ejectment, or a
suit for breach of contract, the vendee shall have
the right to counterclaim for the amount of the
installments of principal that he has paid minus:
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a-The damage that the vendor has suffered,
and
b-A reasonable rental for the period in which
the vendee was in possession.
(Note: The vendee shall not have the right
to sue for any taxes, assessments or insur-
ance for which he has paid.)
4-If the vendee has made any permanent improve-
ments on the land, which have resulted in an
increase of its market value, the vendee may
also sue for such increase, provided, however,
that he shall not be able to recover more than
the cost of such improvements.
Article B-Applicability
l-This statute shall apply to all installment con-
tracts for the purchase and sale of land, which
are made after the date of this statute, regard-
less of any provision in any contract to the con-
trary.
2-This Statute is in addition to, and not merely
declaratory of, the common law.
Article C-Definitions
1-An installment contract is a legally binding
executory agreement which (has as its purpose
the transfer or) is intended in any way to effect
a transfer of an interest in land by the following
method:
Whereby the vendee (or any individual, part-
nership, corporation, agency or any other legal
unit which acts for the benefit of the vendee)
promises to pay to the vendor (or any individ-
ual, partnership, corporation, agency or any
other legal unit which acts for the benefit of
vendor) an amount of money (or other lawful
consideration) at stated periods after the com-
pletion of the contract which may be weekly, bi-
weekly, monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or an-
nually. (But this statute shall apply even though
the payments are not pursued according to the
previously referred to periods, as long as the
method of payment is essentially in the form
of deferred payments numbering more than one,
exclusive of any down payments.)
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2-A down payment is a payment made at the date
of execution of the contract. The making or
commission of a down payment shall not operate
to exclude the operation of this statute upon
installment contracts.
13-Land is any interest in real property.
Article D-Void Clauses
1-Any provision that "time is of the essence" (or
any provision of substantially similar import);
or any provision that there shall be an accelera-
tion of vendee's payments if the vendee has
defaulted; or any provision that vendor shall
not be deemed to waive any of the stipulations
in the contract in event of vendee's default; or
provision that vendor shall have any right in
the nature of foreclosure or forfeiture in event
of vendee's default, shall be void.
SECTION Il-And be it further Enacted that this Act shall
tak e eff ect o n ........................ .............................................
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